\u3cem\u3eCitizens United\u3c/em\u3e and Social Welfare Organizations: The Tangled Relationships among Guidance, Compliance, and Enforcement by Hill, Frances R.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
2014
Citizens United and Social Welfare Organizations:
The Tangled Relationships among Guidance,
Compliance, and Enforcement
Frances R. Hill
University of Miami School of Law, fhill@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frances R. Hill, Citizens United and Social Welfare Organizations: The Tangled Relationships among Guidance, Compliance, and
Enforcement, 43 Stetson L. Rev. 539 (2014).
CITIZENS UNITED AND SOCIAL WELFARE
ORGANIZATIONS: THE TANGLED
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GUIDANCE,
COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT
Frances R. Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Citizens United on
January 21, 2010.' On May 10, 2013, the Exempt Organization
Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imploded when its
then-Director offered lawyers assembled for the annual spring
meeting of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the Tax
Section of the American Bar Association her interpretations of
her self-described efforts to correct problems in the administra-
tion of the tax law applicable to § 501(c)(4) organizations.
Remarks at meetings of the Exempt Organizations Committee
are interesting to those who attend, but, it is safe to say, to few
others. These remarks were the exception. These remarks, and a
contentious press conference following them, received immediate
and extensive press coverage.3 It was clear that the leadership of
* @ 2014, Frances R. Hill. All rights reserved. Professor of Law and Dean's
Distinguished Scholar for the Profession, University of Miami School of Law. J.D., Yale
Law School, 1984; Ph.D., Harvard University Department of Government, 1973.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. The Author was in the room for these remarks.
3. Aaron Blake, 'I'm Not Good At Math': The IRS's Public Relations Disaster,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/10/im-not-good-at-math-the-irss
-public-relations-disaster/ (May 10, 2013, 2:18 p.m.); Lauren French, IRS Officials Knew of
Tea Party Targeting, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/irs-knew-tea-party-targeted-in
-2011-91214.html (May 11, 2013, 3:09 p.m. EDT); Lauren French & Kelsey Snell, IRS
under Siege with No Friends, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/irs-under-siege
-91206.html (May 10, 2013, 7:18 p.m. EDT); Zachary A. Goldfarb & Karen Tumulty, IRS
Admits Targeting Conservatives for Tax Scrutiny in 2012 Election, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-admits-targeting-conservatives-for-tax-scrutiny
-in-2012-election/2013/05/10/3b6aOada-b987-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story.html (May 10,
2013).
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the Exempt Organizations Division had put the IRS in the eye of
a storm.
Four days after the then-Director of the Exempt
Organizations Division ignited the firestorm over targeting
particular organizations seeking exemption as organizations
described in § 501(c)(4), the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) issued a report critical of the IRS'
handling of these applications for tax exemption submitted by
various entities during the 2012 election cycle.' The TIGTA
Report found that "[tihe IRS used inappropriate criteria that
identified for review Tea Party and other organizations applying
for tax-exempt status based upon their names or policy positions
instead of indications of potential political campaign interven-
tion.", Attributing the cause of this situation to "ineffective
management," the TIGTA Report found that "[i]neffective
management: (1) allowed inappropriate criteria to be devel-
oped and stay in place for more than 18 months, (2) resulted
in substantial delays in processing certain applications, and
(3) allowed unnecessary information requests to be issued."' The
TIGTA Report cited a failure to provide guidance to those charged
with implementing the law as a factor contributing to the use of
inappropriate criteria for selecting particular organizations for
scrutiny. The TIGTA Report also cited the failure to provide
guidance and the reliance on training instead of guidance as
significant factors in the delays in processing cases.8 The TIGTA
Report found this approach insufficient, stating:
We believe that specific guidance should be developed and
made available to specialists processing potential political
cases. Making this guidance available on the Internet for
organizations could also address a concern raised in the IRS's
4. For a survey of reactions from members of Congress published on the Monday after
the remarks on Friday, May 10, 2013, see Fred Stokeld, IRS Sparks Outrage With
Admission It Mistreated Tea Party Groups (May 13, 2013) (2013 TNT 92-3). For an
assessment of the situation almost ten months later, see Thomas B. Edsall, Why the I.R.S.
Scandal Won't Go Away, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/opinion/edsall-why-the-irs
-scandal-wont-go-away.html?_r=0 (Feb. 25, 2014).
5. Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review,
Ref. No. 2013-10-053 (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury May 14, 2013) (available at http://www
.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf) [hereinafter TIGTA Report].
6. Id. at "Highlights."
7. Id.
8. Id. at 14.
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response that many applications appear to contain incomplete
and inconsistent information.9
In other words, the TIGTA Report found a relationship
between guidance for both officials and the public and compliance
by organizations seeking exempt status. This finding became the
basis for Recommendation 5 in the TIGTA Report, calling on the
IRS to "[d]evelop guidance for specialists on how to process
requests for tax-exempt status involving potentially significant
political campaign intervention. This guidance should also be
posted to the Internet to provide transparency to organizations on
the application process."'o The IRS rejected this recommendation
and proposed instead to offer training to its officials." The TIGTA
Report rejected this alternative approach, stating:
We do not believe that this alternate corrective action fully
addresses our recommendation. We believe that specific guid-
ance should be developed and made available to specialists
processing potential political cases. Making this guidance
available on the Internet for organizations could also address a
concern raised in the IRS's response that many applications
appear to contain incomplete and inconsistent information.12
The TIGTA Report and the continuing controversy over it
have raised questions about the proper role of the IRS when tax
exempt entities become involved in election campaigns. The IRS
does not exist to implement campaign finance law or to
ameliorate the dysfunction of the Federal Election Commission
(FEC)." It does exist to administer tax law in a manner that
ensures that organizations exempt from taxation use their
resources for their exempt purpose. 4 This task posed a significant
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 16.
11. Id.; see also id. at 47 (containing IRS Management's response to the draft report).
The IRS did agree with Recommendation 8 that required only that the IRS recommend to
the IRS Chief Counsel and the Department of the Treasury that they develop guidance on
how to measure the "primary activity" of a § 501(c)(4) organization. Id. at 17.
12. Id.
13. For an incisive critique of FEC dysfunction, see Trevor Potter, How the FEC Can
Stop the Tidal Wave of Secret Political Cash, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
how-the-fec-can-stop-the-tidal-wave-of-secret-political-cashl2012/11/16/966c48c-2dae-11e2
-89d4-040c9330702a_story.html (Nov. 16, 2012).
14. The exempt purpose of a § 501(c)(4) organization is "the promotion of social
welfare." 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
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challenge to the IRS long before the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Citizens United. That opinion posed new challenges to
the IRS in reconciling its tax mission with the expanded rights of
entities to engage in political speech. The IRS' failure to address
these challenges for at least fifty years played a significant role in
the crisis that became public in 2013.
This Article explores the roles of the IRS and the Supreme
Court in creating the conditions for the redesign of § 501(c)(4)
organizations as campaign finance vehicles, which resulted in the
current crisis. Part II discusses the long-term failure of the IRS to
issue guidance relating to § 501(c)(4), including its failure to issue
any guidance in response to Citizens United. Part III discusses
the impact of Citizens United on the structure and operation of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. Part IV examines the impact of the
Court's insistence in Citizens United that regulatory agencies
play a limited role in campaign finance regulation and that tests
based on facts and circumstances are themselves constitutionally
impermissible burdens on political speech. Part V discusses the
response of the reconstituted but not yet reformed IRS. Part VI
offers a brief conclusion focused on the challenges going forward.
II. SECTION 501(C) (4): THE IRS' HISTORIC FAILURE TO
PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND WHY IT STILL MATTERS
Guidance matters because those subject to a law have a right
to know what that law requires and how the law is being
interpreted and administered. Guidance enables compliance but
does not ensure it. Those subject to a law also have a right to
reliable information about the consequences of noncompliance. In
this sense, guidance makes enforcement legitimate by defining
the terms and the limits of enforcement actions. Guidance, then,
is essential for both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of
enforcement actions by administrative agencies. Assuming that
Congress intends that the statutes it enacts will be implemented
and enforced, guidance by administrative agencies is essential."5
15. The Internal Revenue Code contains a broad delegation of authority to the
Department of the Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason
of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). For purposes
of this Article, the relationships among officials of the Treasury Department, the IRS, and
Chief Counsel are not addressed separately. For an insightful analysis of the multiple
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None of these considerations seem to have resulted in the issu-
ance of fundamental guidance with respect to § 501(c)(4), either
before or after Citizens United was decided.1 6
The IRS has been responsible for a dual failure to issue
needed guidance-a failure to issue guidance with respect to
what constitutes social welfare, the sole exempt purpose of a
§ 501(c)(4) organization, and a failure to issue guidance with
respect to the permissible election campaign activities of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, either before or after the Court decided
Citizens United. The result of this dual failure was to create an
exempt entity that could be adapted to the desire of some for a
campaign finance vehicle that was not required to disclose its
contributors and that could collect and deploy previously
unimaginable amounts of campaign cash. As a result, the IRS
failed to protect the integrity of § 501(c)(4), and it failed to
distinguish between a right to engage in political speech and the
abuse of tax-exempt status.
Section 501(c)(4) is the shortest provision in the enumeration
of types of exempt entities in § 501. It consists solely of a ref-
erence to "[clivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit
but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.""
This provision has been in the tax law since the Revenue Act of
1913, the beginning of the modern income tax." The applicable
regulations have done little to clarify and amplify this cryptic
statutory language. The applicable regulations simply state that
"[a]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way
the common good and general welfare of the people of the
community"" and describe qualifying organizations as "operat-
forms of tax guidance, see Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land of Tax
Code Interpretation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239 (2009).
16. See Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the
Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 854 (2012) (analyzing how the failure to issue meaningful
guidance and the issuance of guidance that is inconsistent with the statute are akin to
"customary deviations" causing diminishing respect for the Code among officials
responsible for interpreting and administering it).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A).
18. Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 172 (1913).
19. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2012). The shift in language from "exclusively" in
the Code to "primarily" in the regulations denotes a second-order controversy that cannot
be addressed without proper guidance on what activities constitute "social welfare." The
Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21, two campaign finance reform organizations,
provided a comprehensive statement of their joint position in a letter to the IRS on
543
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[ing] primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments
and social improvements." 0
The failure to issue meaningful guidance for the entire
century that § 501(c)(4) has been in the Code has been founda-
tional, pervasive, and intentional."' The IRS has long found it
convenient to use § 501(c)(4) as a "catchall" or even a "dumping
ground" to avoid making hard choices about difficult issues."
While the convenience of this approach may have paid dividends
to the IRS and its officials at particular points in the history of
the IRS, the cumulative failure has had substantial negative
consequences for the IRS as an institution in the current contro-
versy.2 3 The negative consequences of the actions of the leadership
of the exempt organization function are not limited to the IRS.
These negative consequences extend to exempt entities by leaving
them even more vulnerable to the self-serving interests of those
who see no problem in financing their personal interests through
exempt entities.
The fundamental failure was the failure and, indeed, the
refusal to provide meaningful guidance with respect to the
concept of "social welfare," which is the sole exempt purpose
articulated for purposes of § 501(c)(4). For a century, this term
has remained without conceptual or operational explanation.
What is social welfare? No meaningful guidance has ever been
developed. An effort made during the 1960s to provide greater
guidance on what constitutes social welfare for purposes of
§ 501(c)(4) concluded with claims that the task of providing
guidance on the meaning of social welfare for purposes of
§ 501(c)(4) was too difficult and that any attempt to address this
question raised even more difficult questions on how an organiza-
tion would be treated if it were denied exemption as an organiza-
September 28, 2011. Ltr. from the Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 to
Commissioner Shulman (Sept. 29, 2011) (2011 TNT 189-16).
20. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
21. For a detailed development of this analysis, see Frances R. Hill & Douglas M.
Mancino, Taxation of Exempt Organizations ch. 13 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2002 with
biannual cumulative supplements) (current Chapter 13 was added to the main volume as
a replacement chapter in 2012).
22. Id. at[ 13.01.
23. See TIGTA Report, supra n. 5, at 5-6 (discussing how a number of political
organizations were classified as § 501(c)(4) organizations, prompting a search for
organizations with "'political-sounding' names"). While these consequences are most
apparent and acute in the Exempt Organizations Division, they are not limited to this
component of the IRS, and other components of the IRS have also been affected.
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tion described in § 501(c)(4).24 The Chief Counsel summed up the
situation in the following terms, stating:
There is general agreement that social welfare signifies benefit
to the community but beyond that knowledgeable technical
people are unable to agree on the meaning of the term. The
practical result is that almost any group activity not classifia-
ble under any other provision [of § 501(c)], not patently illegal
or detrimental to the community and not involving private
gain is accorded "social welfare classification."25
General Counsel Memorandum 33495 also addressed what it
called the "dilemma of denial of exemption," which addressed the
issue of how organizations that failed to qualify for exemption as
organizations described in § 501(c)(4) should be treated for tax
purposes, reasoning that:
Difficult as the interpretative issues are, resolution adverse to
an organization simply shifts the problem to an even more
troublesome area-that is, the tax treatment of the organiza-
tion as a nonexempt entity . .. entities within the ambit of
501(c)(4) are one of the most difficult classes of organizations
to which to apply conventional tax concepts.2 6
General Counsel Memorandum 33495 then addressed what it
described as the "historical function of § 501(c)(4) and its
continuing significance," stating:
More significant than any recital of the ambiguities involved
in interpretation of section 501(c)(4) is what its actual func-
tioning denotes in terms of the inadequacy of the fundamental
concepts of Subchapter F exemption. Stripped of nonessen-
tials, the predominate function of the section has been to
provide a basis for nontaxable treatment of income of organi-
zations which lack the traditionally essential characteristics of
taxable entities or whose receipts do not constitute economic
gain. In other words, the section has in a very large part
operated as a catch-all classification for organizations with
24. General Counsel Memorandum 33495 (Apr. 27, 1967) (available at http://www
.intelliconnect.cch.com (subscription required)) (analyzing the difficulties of developing the
concept of social welfare).
25. Id. (quoting a 1966 study by the Chief Counsel's Office entitled Preliminary
Analysis of Unadministrability of Exempt Organizations Area (May 3, 1966)).
26. Id.
545
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respect to which assertion of tax liability is offensive to
commonly accepted concepts of taxability.27
The IRS has never seen fit to explain why developing guid-
ance on the topic of social welfare presents insurmountable diffi-
culties even though it has issued guidance on concepts as complex
as education or charity.
Without an operationally meaningful concept of social
welfare, any reasonable expectation of what organizations might
qualify for exemption as organizations described in § 501(c)(4)
lacks a solid conceptual foundation. The failure to develop this
kind of guidance means that there is little guidance on how
particular types of activities might satisfy the exempt purpose of
promoting the social welfare of the people of the community.2 8
Without meaningful guidance on this connection between the
exempt purpose and particular activities, determinations of
exempt status as organizations described in § 501(c)(4) are not
grounded in considerations relevant to the reason that § 501(c)(4)
is in the Code and why such organizations should be exempt
from federal income tax. Stated in other terms, the IRS has
not provided foundational guidance on what types of activities
promote the social welfare of the people of the community and
how this determination is to be made.
Even in the absence of guidance on the meaning of social
welfare, the IRS did develop a concept of structural private
benefit that became the one point of coherence in the law of
§ 501(c)(4). 29 The regulations refer to the social welfare of the
people of the community.ao In the absence of an operational
concept of social welfare that could provide guidance for compli-
ance and enforcement, the IRS developed an approach based
on the idea that whatever activities a § 501(c)(4) organization
engaged in would not support exempt status if its activities
27. Id.
28. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
29. "Structural private benefit" is a descriptive term developed by Hill and Mancino to
distinguish the kind of private benefit based on extending preferences solely or primarily
to the members of the organization from the type of private benefit based on the personal
greed of organization managers and other insiders. See Hill & Mancino, supra n. 21, at
1 13.03[2].
30. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
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impermissibly benefitted the members of the organization rather
than the people of the community more generally.
Members of the organization could benefit, but only in the
manner and to the extent that members of the community bene-
fitted.3 ' The concept of structural private benefit has played an
important role in defining limits to such activities as homeowners
associations and tenants associations, but it does not serve as a
replacement for an operational concept of social welfare more
generally.
The second failure to issue guidance relates to advocacy
activities. The regulations provide that "[t]he promotion of social
welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office."3 2 The regulations do not provide
any insight into what activities might constitute "indirect" partic-
ipation or intervention in a political campaign. The architecture
of the guidance with respect to political campaign activities
consists of two basic principles-social welfare organizations may
engage in some political campaign activity, but because these
activities do not constitute social welfare activities, political cam-
paign activity may not constitute the primary activity of a social
welfare organization.
Conceptualizing these principles in operational and adminis-
trable terms presents challenges of characterization and compu-
tation that the IRS has gone out of its way to avoid. The problems
of characterization consist of identifying activities that constitute
direct and indirect participation in election campaigns in ways
that support or oppose one or more candidates for public office.
The problems of computation involve the definition of what
constitutes the primary activity or activities of a § 501(c)(4)
organization. The failure to provide an operational concept of
social welfare makes computing the percentage of share of an
organization's activities that are devoted to social welfare
impossible. Without this baseline computation, it is not possible
31. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i).
32. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
33. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (addressing political activity). The IRS has
generally taken the position that the same principles apply to the characterization of
political activities for all types of § 501(c) organizations, and has focused on guidance for
§ 501(c)(3) organizations that are subject to a statutory prohibition on political campaign
activities. Hill & Mancino, supra n. 21, at T 13.08[21.
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to determine what share of an organization's activities is devoted
to political campaign activity.
Developing a methodology to determine the primary activity
of an exempt entity is far from simple. Section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions engage in multiple activities, including promotion of social
welfare, related business activities, unrelated business activities,
investment activities, issue advocacy, lobbying, election campaign
activities, and activities that promote private benefit. These
various activities are pursued using money, staff time, and even
volunteer time in some cases. Questions of how these various
assets should be allocated to various activities raises multiple
issues. For example, how is staff time allocated to the organiza-
tions' various activities? How does an organization take account
of activities resulting in private benefit? Without addressing
these and many other issues, there is little reason for confidence
in any computation of whether the organization devotes itself
primarily to social welfare activities or of the extent of the
organization's resources devoted to political campaign activities.
During the 2012 campaign cycle, none of these complexities
were acknowledged by either the IRS or its critics. Instead,
various interests engaged in a heated discussion around two
related but distinguishable topics. One was whether the reference
to "exclusively" in the Code was inconsistent with the reference
to "primarily" in the regulations.34 The other was whether
"primarily" meant fifty-one percent or something more. These
discussions are most charitably described as conceptually and
methodologically premature. The result was a series of heated
discussions about a fraction (or, if one prefers, a percentage)
without any idea of what computing this fraction (or percentage)
entails.
The IRS' refusal to issue guidance meant that the increasing
interest in using § 501(c)(4) as the framework for yet another
campaign finance vehicle resulted in a crisis over enforcement.
The failure to have issued guidance before engaging in highly
sensitive enforcement gave force to allegations that parti-
san interests, not principled tax administration, explained the
treatment of particular cases. In the context of a national elec-
34. Some of these discussions are on display in various letters to the IRS from the
Campaign Legal Center, all of which are collected at www.campaignlegalcenter.org. See
also n. 19, supra.
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tion, even allegations without any corroboration become combus-
tible, in part because such allegations go to the heart of lawful
governance and in part because the personal political prospects
of powerful donors seeking influence and powerful politicians
seeking reelection are directly impacted, or so they claimed.
Throughout the 2012 election cycle, members of Congress
from both parties complained that the IRS was administering
§ 501(c)(4) in ways that benefitted their political opponents and
insisted that the IRS administer § 501(c)(4) in ways that
benefitted them.3 5 These self-interested demands by powerful
politicians were consistent with the green light turned on by the
Supreme Court in Citizens United. This new environment exac-
erbated the consequences of and the controversies over the IRS'
historic failure to administer the law applicable to § 501(c)(4)
organizations.
III. CITIZENS UNITED: ENABLING THE REDESIGN OF
§ 501 (C) (4) ORGANIZATIONS AS CAMPAIGN
FINANCE VEHICLES
As the lower court acknowledged, Citizens United is a
§ 501(c)(4) organization.3 ' The Supreme Court never acknowl-
edged Citizens United's tax status or considered its implications.
35. See Ltr. from Seven Democratic Senators to Commissioner Shulman (Feb. 16,
2012) (2012 TNT 34-74) (asking that IRS investigate abuses of § 501(c)(4)) (all citations
are to Tax Notes Today, the online publication of Tax Notes, at www.taxanalysts.com
(subscription required)). Tax Notes contains the most complete and most accessible
archive of the extended correspondence between powerful national politicians and the IRS
during the 2012 election cycle. See also Ltr. from Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) to
Commissioner Shulman (Aug. 31, 2012) (2012 TNT 184-33) (criticizing IRS response to
abuses of § 501(c)(4)); Ltr. from Ten Republican Senators to Commissioner Shulman (Aug.
6, 2012) (2012 TNT 152-16) (questioning IRS interpretations of § 501(c)(4)); Ltr. from
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) to Commissioner Shulman (July 27, 2012) (2012 TNT 184-
34) (seeking specific information about the IRS' interpretation and application of
§ 501(c)(4)); Ltr. from Eleven Republican Senators to Commissioner Shulman (June 18,
2012) (2012 TNT 118-19) (seeking information on IRS requests for names of donors to
§ 501(c)(4) organizations); Ltrs. from Thirty-Two Democratic Members of the House of
Representatives to Commissioner Shulman and President Obama (Mar. 28, 2012) (2012
TNT 62-37) (asking the IRS to investigate improper political activity by § 501(c)(4)
organizations); Ltr. from Twelve Republican Senators to Commissioner Shulman (Mar. 14,
2012) (2012 TNT 51-24) (urging the IRS to avoid selective enforcement of law based on
partisan considerations); Ltr. from Seven Democratic Senators to Commissioner Shulman
(Mar. 13, 2012) (2012 TNT 49-19) (asking for immediate action by the IRS to limit political
activities of § 501(c)(4) organizations).
36. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Nevertheless, the Court's opinion created new possibilities that
enabled political entrepreneurs to redesign both the structure
and the strategies of organizations claiming exemption as organi-
zations described in § 501(c)(4). This Part examines both the
Court's core holdings and the consequences of enabling the use of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations as large, well-funded, and aggressive
campaign finance vehicles.
A. What Citizens United Decided
Citizens United held that the prohibition on the use of
corporate general treasury funds to finance independent expendi-
tures involving express advocacy was a constitutionally imper-
missible burden on the First Amendment right of corporate
entities to engage in political speech." This core holding had two
foundational implications for the structures and operations of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. First, it freed § 501(c)(4) organizations
from the prior requirement that they speak through a political
action committee (PAC)." According to the Court, requiring
corporations to speak through a PAC burdens political speech due
to limits on the persons that may be solicited,3 9 the frequency of
solicitations,40 and the amounts that may be contributed.'
Whether the requirements for establishing and operating a PAC
are burdensome in practice has been questioned by campaign
finance lawyers, in at least one case through a memorably comedic
format.42
37. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. Citizens United overruled Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2007), that had upheld Austin with respect to independent expenditures. Citizens
United did not address the use of general treasury funds to make contributions to
candidates, and thus that particular prohibition, upheld in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146 (2003), remains in place.
38. Separate segregated funds, commonly known as PACs, operate subject to 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b); Section 527 of the Code applies to PACs as well as to all other political
organizations. 26 U.S.C. § 527.
39. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.5, 114.7, 114.8.
40. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B); 11 C.F.R. § 114.6.
41. 2 U.S.C. § 441a.
42. Trevor Potter, a former Chair of the FEC and the general counsel of Senator John
McCain's presidential campaigns, represented Steven Colbert and appeared on The
Colbert Report to explain campaign finance law to Mr. Colbert, who established and
operated both a PAC and a § 501(c)(4) organization during the 2012 election cycle. NPR,
Examining the SuperPAC with Colbert's Trevor Potter, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/23/
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Second, Citizens United rendered irrelevant the limitations
previously imposed on the permissible sources of general treasury
funds that § 501(c)(4) organizations could solicit if the organiza-
tion planned to use any of its general treasury funds for inde-
pendent expenditures. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL)43 permitted § 501(c)(4) organizations to finance independ-
ent expenditures with their general treasury funds only if the
organization accepted no contributions from corporations or labor
unions and if the organization earned no unrelated business
income.4' The holding and reasoning in MCFL was consistent
with the prohibition on the use of corporate general treasury
funds for independent expenditures and the requirement that
corporations establish PACs that were not funded by their
general treasury funds to finance either independent expendi-
tures or contributions to candidates or political organizations.
MCFL set forth an anti-circumvention standard based on a recog-
nition that § 501(c)(4) organizations could be used as alter egos of
their corporate or union contributors.4 5
Freeing § 501(c)(4) organizations from these limitations on
sources of their financing4 6 while clearly affirming their First
147294509/examining-the-superpac-with-colberts-trevor-potter (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:00 a.m.).
Enlightenment and hilarity ensued.
43. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL]. The Supreme Court majority specifically
rejected Citizens United's claim based on relaxing the MCFL requirements and its
argument that its receipts from corporate contributors were quite limited. Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 327-328. The Citizens United majority rejected this claim on the grounds that
granting it would constitute a constitutionally impermissible burden on protected political
speech. Id. at 329.
44. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263-264 (holding that federal restrictions on independent
spending did not apply to the organization because the organization "cannot engage in
business activities," "has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim
on its assets or earnings," and "was not established by a business corporation or a labor
union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities"). These
requirements were incorporated into federal election law in the "qualified nonprofit
corporation" regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c).
45. For Chief Justice Roberts' impatience with arguments based on the threat of
circumvention, see infra Part IV. It should also be noted that nothing in § 501(c)(4)
requires that a § 501(c)(4) organization have more than one contributor. Stated differently,
there is no public support requirement akin to the tests used to distinguish § 501(c)(3)
public charities from § 501(c)(3) private foundations. See 26 U.S.C. 509(a) (listing criteria
for distinguishing a public charity from a private foundation under § 501(c)(3)).
46. The Citizens United majority left two potential issues relating to the sources of
general treasury funds unaddressed. The first is foreign source funds. The second is
funding from government contractors. Neither source is limited under tax law for
§ 501(c)(4) organizations engaged in social welfare activities but both are subject to
limitations on contributions to candidates under federal election law.
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Amendment right to engage in independent expenditures involv-
ing express advocacy meant that § 501(c)(4) organizations could
plan for much larger, more expensive operations.4 7 Indeed, remov-
ing these limits meant that it became cost-effective to design
large, sophisticated § 501(c)(4) organizations able to collect and
deploy very large amounts of money free of the constraints of
federal election law.
B. Redesigning Social Welfare Organizations as Campaign
Finance Vehicles after Citizens United
Citizens United set in motion a period of organizational
creativity in the design and operation of organizations claiming
exemption as organizations described in § 501(c)(4). This creativ-
ity encompassed both structural design and claims made to recon-
cile the expanded campaign activities with exempt status. Any
discussion of the design and operation of § 501(c)(4) organizations
in the wake of Citizens United should begin by acknowledging
how little is known about § 501(c)(4) organizations in general and
how little is known about those § 501(c)(4) organizations that
appear to have been designed or redesigned as campaign finance
structures. 48 What one can say is that the design elements of
politically engaged § 501(c)(4) organizations seem to have taken
advantage not only of the opportunities created, clarified, or
amplified by Citizens United, but also of the opportunities enabled
by the historic and contemporary failure of the IRS to issue guid-
ance, including guidance in response to Citizens United.
The post-Citizens United campaign finance structures built
on a § 501(c)(4) platform incorporate at least four design
elements: (1) collaboration between megadonors and high-profile
political consultants; (2) treating independent expenditures
47. Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
Election L.J. 337, 346 (2011) (noting that the use of § 501(c)(4) organizations by
corporations to engage in election spending "facilitatels] the pooling of funds from many
like-minded corporate donors and the hiring of political strategists to determine where
those funds can be used to the greatest political effect").
48. Much of the information that shaped the discussion of the role of § 501(c)(4)
organizations during the 2012 election cycle is based on the research of The Center for
Responsive Politics, see generally http://www.opensecrets.org, and the research of the
Sunlight Foundation, see Jake Harper, FCC Database Misses Huge Chunk of Ads,
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/10/03/fcc-database-misses-huge-chunk-ads/ (Oct.
3, 2012, 6:36 p.m.) (focusing on Federal Communication Commission disclosure of the
financing of broadcast ads in selected media markets).
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involving express advocacy as the core activity that defined the
nature and scope of other activities; (3) engaging in other
advocacy activities in ways that amplify the message conveyed
through independent expenditures while allowing the organiza-
tion to claim that it was not primarily engaged in election
campaign activities; and (4) in the case of some megadonors,
creating networks of organizations that continually move money
among component organizations. Other elements may well
emerge as more is learned about these entities.
The first design element is the collaboration between political
operatives, some of whom have their own high-profile national
reputations, and megadonors, who contribute with the expecta-
tion that their money will be used to produce the election results
that they are willing to pay for." Political consultants' careers are
made or broken by the consultants' ongoing ability to produce
political results. They work for entities capable of raising the
money that is needed to win elections. The terms of the collabora-
tion between megadonors and campaign consultants cannot
be determined by the available data. However, the post-election
dynamic suggests that the megadonors are the dominant
partners." If the megadonors signal that they have not been well
served by the campaign operatives, no matter how prominent
they may be, an organization linked with that political operative
may well not remain viable."
The second operational design element of post-Citizens
United § 501(c)(4) organizations is that hard-hitting express
advocacy messaging appears to be their core activity. It is difficult
49. See Mike Allen, Sheldon Adelson: Inside the Mind of the Mega-Donor,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81588.html (posted Sept. 23, 2012, 9:12 p.m.
EST) (profile of Sheldon Adelson, a casino owner and megadonor to GOP candidates).
50. See Kenneth P. Vogel, Karl Rove under Fire, http://www.politico.comfnews/
stories/1112/83658.html (Nov. 10, 2012, 7:13 a.m. EST) (assessment in the immediate
aftermath of the 2012 election).
51. See generally id. (assessing impact of election losses on Rove's professional
reputation); see also Nicholas Confessore & Jess Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by
Big Donors, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/little-to-show-for-cash-flood-by
-big-donors.html (Nov. 7, 2012) (highlighting the response of certain megadonors to
election losses); Karen Tumulty, Karl Rove and His Super PAC Vow to Press On,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/karl-rove-and-his-super-pac-vow-to-press-on/2012/
11/10/19ed28ea-2a96-11e2-b4eO-346287b7e56c story.html (Nov. 10, 2012) (calling the
performance reviews of Rove's PAC "scathing"); Kenneth P. Vogel, The Billion-Dollar
Bust? http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83534.html (updated Nov. 10, 2012, 6:58
p.m. EST) (stating that some Republican megadonors will be "changing their ways" after
the failed 2012 election campaign).
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to imagine that these organizations would exist without a clearly
articulated constitutional right to engage in express advocacy.
This is what the Supreme Court provided in Citizens United.52
The large organizations appear to have developed a finely honed
rapid response capacity to run ads responding to the latest twists
and turns in a campaign.5 ' The large post-Citizens United
organizations with national profiles do not appear to be
grassroots organizations designed to collect funds from small
donors united by a shared belief in a particular cause or policy
apart from the election or defeat of particular candidates for
public office. Grassroots organizations are unlikely to be able to
raise enough money rapidly enough to develop this kind of rapid
response capacity. In addition, a § 501(c)(4) organization defined
by a social welfare mission is likely to want that mission reflected
in its political messaging, but advancing the mission is not
always consistent with the rapid response capacity that political
organizations value. A post-Citizens United § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion will reshape its messaging as many times as circumstances
require to win the election, unencumbered by a mission that
might constrain changes in the campaign-driven messaging.
The third operational design element of a post-Citizens
United organization is that all of its activities other than inde-
pendent expenditures for messages involving express advocacy
will be undertaken to amplify the message of the organization's
express advocacy. This is consistent with designing a campaign
finance structure that claims tax-exempt status while appearing
to operate primarily to promote the election or defeat of one or
more clearly identified candidates for public office. Reliance on
messaging with some claim (although not necessarily a legally
sustainable claim) that the messaging is properly characterized
as lobbying or issue advocacy allows the organization to claim
that it is an organization described in § 501(c)(4). This design
52. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (holding that the decision to overrule Austin
"effectively invalidate[d] not only BCRA Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b's prohibition
on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy") (internal quotations omitted).
53. This is the Author's perspective as a Florida voter who turned on her television
during the 2012 election season. Social welfare organizations that are promoting a policy
agenda of their own would be less likely to have developed this capacity and more likely to
use their own funds to promote their core cause. Developing the empirical evidence to
support or refute this hypothesis would be worth the effort, but it may be hampered by the
low level of television ad buys by organizations that were not primarily interested in shap-
ing election results.
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element allows the organization to devote all its resources to
election campaign messaging during the electoral cycle without
any duty to disclose the amounts allocated to the purported
lobbying or issue advocacy. Section 501(c)(4) organizations are not
required to file an application for recognition of exempt status but
can instead operate as "self-declared" § 501(c)(4) organizations
and then file an information return. With the available exten-
sions, such an organization can expect to operate for over two
years even when its claim to § 501(c)(4) status is groundless. In
practice, this means that such organizations can operate without
constraints and without disclosure. To achieve this result, the
organization must be able to do more than just argue that its
lobbying and issue advocacy do not constitute election campaign
activities; it must show that these activities, which constitute the
organization's primary purpose, promote the social welfare in
compliance with § 501(c)(4).
The fourth design element is to develop a network of organi-
zations for the purpose of moving money among the component
organizations on what appears to be a continuous basis.54 What is
known about moving money within networks of nonprofit and
some taxable entities is due to the work of the Center for Respon-
sive Politics, which created a database tracing money among
certain organizations. These movements of money seemed to have
been quite purposeful and intentional. These patterns suggest
that preventing disclosure is one purpose, but they also suggest
plans related to rapid response capabilities may also be factors.
These design elements take advantage of the IRS' failure to
provide fundamental guidance" and the Supreme Court's holding
that the First Amendment right of political speech extends to
entities, including § 501(c)(4) organizations. At the same time,
the designers of the post-Citizens United § 501(c)(4) organizations
54. See The Ctr. for Responsive Pols., The Shadow Money Trail, http://www
.opensecrets.org/news/reports/moneytrail.php (containing a series of studies produced by
The Center for Responsive Politics); see also Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political Coalition,
Designed to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/koch-backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012
-elections/2014101/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e story.html (Jan. 5, 2014)
(illustrating the flow of campaign contributions over the course of several years) (see also
the interactive database).
55. See supra pt. II (discussing the IRS' historic failure to provide guidance for
§ 501(c)(4) organizations).
56. See supra pt. III(A) (outlining the impact of the Citizens United decision).
555
Stetson Law Review
also had to design an interpretation of § 501(c)(4) that would
reconcile the clear statutory requirement that § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations operate to promote the social welfare of the people of the
community with the expanded opportunities for election cam-
paign activity funded by general treasury funds. In effect, the
redesigned § 501(c)(4) entities require a redesigned interpretation
of § 501(c)(4) that explains and protects their tax-exempt status.7
C. Redesigning the Interpretation of § 501(c)(4)
The designers of the post-Citizens United framework
benefitted from the historic failure of the IRS to issue guidance
that would have clarified the nature of the social welfare as the
exempt purpose of a § 501(c)(4) organization as well as from the
failure to address the scope of permissible election campaign
activity. The failure of the IRS to develop guidance addressing
the opportunities created, clarified, amplified, or entrenched by
Citizens United signals that the idea of § 501(c)(4) as a "catchall"
or a "dumping ground" has not ended.
This signal was reinforced by the decision of the IRS to
assure megadonors that the lingering issue of whether contribu-
tions to § 501(c)(4) organizations were subject to the gift tax
would not prove troublesome." It appears that the IRS had not
enforced this provision of the gift tax even though it had issued a
revenue ruling stating that contributions to § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions, unlike contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, were
subject to the gift tax.5 9 The issue gained renewed prominence
when the IRS contacted five donors to § 501(c)(4) organizations
regarding payment of gift tax on the contributions. Six
Republican senators, all of whom were members of the Senate
Finance Committee, wrote to Commissioner Shulman seeking an
57. Protecting tax exempt status was important primarily because § 501(c)(4)
organizations have more limited disclosure obligations under § 527(f) than do § 527 politi-
cal organizations.
58. See John R. Luckey & Erika K. Lunder, 501(c)(4)s and the Gift Tax: Legal Analysis
1-4 (Cong. Research Serv. Aug. 10, 2012) (providing insightful discussion of relevant
issues); see also Memo. from Steven T. Miller, Dep. Comm'r for Servs. and Enforcement,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to Chief Counsel, IRS, Guidance for SB/SE Estate and Gift
Tax and TE/GE Exempt Organizations 1 (July 7, 2011) (available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/guidance.for irssbseestate and-gifttax and-tege-exempt-organizations
.pdf) (stating that "all current examinations relating to the application of gift tax to
contributions to I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations should be closed").
59. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220.
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explanation.6 0 Commissioner Shulman responded with assur-
ances that these audits were not partisan.6 1 By early July 2011
the IRS closed the audits that had been initiated and suspended
any further such audits.6 2 hen questions arose in the 2012
election cycle, the IRS did not issue reasoned and principled
guidance but simply informed members of Congress who had
written to the IRS expressing concern that the law might be
enforced to assure them that the IRS would not enforce its own
interpretation of the gift tax. The path to a new interpretation of
§ 501(c)(4) articulated by the interests operating redesigned
§ 501(c)(4) organizations seemed to be remarkably clear.
The result was an interpretation of § 501(c)(4) by political
entrepreneurs consistent with the redesign of § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations as campaign finance vehicles. This interpretation of
§ 501(c)(4) is based on the following four propositions: (1) only
express advocacy constitutes political activity for a § 501(c)(4)
organizations; (2) lobbying and issue advocacy constitute social
welfare and thus may serve as the primary purpose of a
§ 501(c)(4) organization; (3) characterization of activities is based
on intrinsic factors, especially the literal words of a campaign
communication, not on intent, consequences, or context; and
(4) money that is held only for brief periods of time cannot be
taken into account for determining the primary purpose of an
organization.
First, even the large, well-funded, and aggressive § 501(c)(4)
organizations are not claiming that they can engage solely or
primarily in communications that involve express advocacy. They
appear to be claiming instead that express advocacy is the
only activity that constitutes political activity for purposes of
60. Ltr. from Six Republican Senators to Commissioner Shulman (May 18, 2011) (2011
TNT 97-31).
61. Ltr. from Commissioner Shulman to Senator Thune (May 31, 2011) (2011 TNT
109-36).
62. Memo. from the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement to the
Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division (July 7, 2011) (2011 TNT 131-18).
The IRS did not engage in efforts to develop guidance in this area. This episode is a vivid
and not-reassuring example of Professor Zelenak's insights into the negative consequences
of "customary deviations" in tax administration. See Zelenak, supra n. 16, at 833 (stating
that the IRS has a long history of deviating from its own regulations). For an overview of
this issue expressing ambivalence about the proper course, see Ellen P. Aprill, Once and
Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Curreat Law,
Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 289
(2012).
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determining whether a § 501(c)(4) organization is engaged pri-
marily in political activity.
Second, legislative lobbying, including both grassroots
lobbying and direct lobbying, constitutes social welfare for
purposes of § 501(c)(4). This claim allows § 501(c)(4) organizations
to treat advocacy activities that do not constitute independent
expenditures to serve the operational goal of amplifying the
political messaging of the independent expenditures while at the
same time satisfying the tax law requirement that a § 501(c)(4)
organization engage primarily in activities that promote the
social welfare of the people of the community.
Third, the IRS' characterization of activities depends on
intrinsic characteristics rather than on the context in which these
activities occur. This claim is particularly important to § 501(c)(4)
organizations that engage in substantial independent expendi-
tures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of clearly
identified candidates for public office. Whether or in what
manner or to what degree this factor might shape the charac-
terization of other forms of advocacy is one of the new and
unaddressed issues in determining whether organizations qualify
for exemption as organizations described in § 501(c)(4). If and to
what extent this new factor matters to the characterization of
activities that have been subject to IRS characterization in
contexts in which the organization did not engage in independent
expenditures involving express advocacy, that guidance will offer
little or no support for claims to exempt status by redesigned
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.
Fourth, money that is held only briefly in the general treas-
ury of an exempt entity and then distributed to another entity
cannot be used for the purpose of characterizing the activities of
the organization or for the purpose of determining its primary
activity.
Taken together, the operational design elements and the
elements of a jurisprudence of § 501(c)(4) based on the reasoning
of Citizens United resulted in § 501(c)(4) organizations designed
to put express advocacy through independent expenditures at the
center of their operations without conceding that they are
engaged primarily in political campaign activities within the
meaning of either federal election law or tax law. Organizations
that could operate in this new space freed from the limitations of
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prior law could operate with previously unimaginable amounts of
money. 3
No redesign of the interpretation of § 501(c)(4) will protect
the post-Citizens United § 501(c)(4) organizations unless both the
guidance and enforcement capacities of the IRS and the FEC are
curtailed. Citizens United articulates a First Amendment juris-
prudence designed to curtail the discretion of administrative
agencies to limit the use of general treasury funds for independ-
ent expenditures involving express advocacy.
IV. THE COURT'S EFFORTS TO CIRCUMSCRIBE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
The elements of Citizens United that enabled the redesigned
§ 501(c)(4) organizations have received more attention than have
the elements of the opinion dealing with the role of the FEC and
the type of guidance that it can issue without imposing a
constitutionally impermissible burden on corporate entities' right
to use their general treasury funds to finance independent
expenditures. This Part suggests that the Court's jurisprudential
concerns are fundamentally important for asserting its primacy
in the area of campaign finance.
Citizens United builds on the jurisprudential foundation
developed in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. II (WRTL II),'
which was decided only three years before Citizens United." Both
cases devote significant attention to methods of interpreting and
administering federal election law. Both cases provide extended
analysis of the relationship between complex legal requirements
and congressional or agency discretion. Both cases incorporate a
theory of balance of powers under which only the courts are
suitable interpreters and protectors of political speech rights.
WRTL II dealt with the distinction between the functional
equivalent of express advocacy and issue advocacy for purpose of
63. See Nicholas Confessore, The Caucus, Total Cost of Election Could Be $6 Bil-
lion, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/total-cost-of-election-could-be-6-billion/
(Oct. 31, 2012, 5:54 p.m.) (finding that increased contributions from political organizations
would result in a record-setting six billion dollars in election spending in 2012).
64. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
65. For an analysis of WRTL II, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and the
Balance of Powers: A New Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin
Right To Life, 27 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 267 (2008).
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determining the scope of the application of the definition of an
electioneering communication under the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA), which imposes penalties on electioneering
communications during defined periods before primary and gen-
eral elections.66 In making this distinction, Chief Justice Roberts
stated that "we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not
censorship."6 7
In implementing this decision principle, Chief Justice
Roberts found what he called "censorship" in the use of complex,
fact-intensive definitions.68 To Chief Justice Roberts, tests requir-
ing more facts are constitutionally suspect. This line of reasoning
led him to reject any test based on either intent or effects.69 His
discussion of intent begins by eliding the concept of intent into
the concept of subjective intent.70 To Chief Justice Roberts,
subjective intent is a preference that is unknowable. To support
this conclusion, the Chief Justice cited the FEC's brief, which
stated that a "'constitutional standard that turned on the
subjective sincerity of a speaker's message would likely be incapa-
ble of workable application; at a minimum, it would invite costly,
fact-dependent litigation."'7 2
Chief Justice Roberts then took the position that litigation
was in itself "a severe burden on political speech," pointing to the
history of the WRTL II case:
Consider what happened in these cases. The District Court
permitted extensive discovery on the assumption that WRTL's
intent was relevant. As a result, the defendants deposed
WRTL's executive director, its legislative director, its political
action committee director, its lead communications consultant,
and one of its fundraisers. WRTL also had to turn over many
66. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (2002).
67. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 482.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 468 (stating that "tan intent-based standard blankets with uncertainty
whatever may be said, and offers no security for free discussion") (internal quotations
omitted).
70. Id. at 467.
71. See id. at 468 (noting that "an intent-based test would chill core political speech by
opening the door to a trial on every ad within the terms of § 203, on the theory that the
speaker actually intended to affect an election, no matter how compelling the indications
that the ad concerned a pending legislative or policy issue").
72. Id. (quoting Br. for Appellee, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC 1, 2005 WL
3499672 at *39 (No. 04-1581, 546 U.S. 410 (2006))).
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documents related to its operations, plans, and finances. Such
litigation constitutes a severe burden on political speech.
The opinion never considered the possibility that the facts were
complex but instead treated complexity as a choice that served no
purpose, or at least not a constitutionally permissible purpose.
Chief Justice Roberts then found that such fact-intensive
intent tests would not produce principled results that were appro-
priately uniform across cases, but that "[a] test focused on the
speaker's intent could lead to the bizarre result that identical ads
aired at the same time could be protected speech for one speaker,
while leading to criminal penalties for another.""
Chief Justice Robert applied the same analysis to tests based
on the effects of speech, which he concluded "would also typically
lead to a burdensome, expert-driven inquiry, with an indetermi-
nate result.""7 He concluded that "[]itigation on such a standard
may or may not accurately predict electoral effects, but it will
unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech."70
Based on this critique of fact-intensive multifactor tests,
Chief Justice Roberts specified the parameters of the proper
bases for a test for distinguishing issue advocacy from the kind of
political speech that was the functional equivalent of express
advocacy that could be regulated as an "electioneering communi-
cation."7 For this purpose, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that
the proper standard for an as-applied challenge to BCRA § 203
must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communi-
cation rather than amorphous considerations of intent and
effect.... It must entail minimal if any discovery, to allow
parties to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech
through the threat of burdensome litigation... . And it must
eschew "the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors," which
"invit[es] complex argument in a trial court and a virtually
inevitable appeal.". . . In short, it must give the benefit of any
doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.
73. Id. at 468 n. 5.
74. Id. at 468.
75. Id. at 469.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 476 n. 8 (holding that "'purpose' is not the appropriate test for distinguishing
between genuine issue ads and the functional equivalent of express campaign advocacy").
78. Id. at 469.
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The Chief Justice then articulated his test, stating that "[i]n
light of these considerations, a court should find that an ad is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is suscep-
tible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate."09 The Chief Justice then
explained why the ads at issue in the case did not constitute the
functional equivalent of express advocacy, reasoning:
First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue
ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the
issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the
public to contact public officials with respect to the matter.
Second, their content lacks indicia of express advocacy: The
ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or
challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate's
character, qualifications, or fitness for office.80
Based on this test, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the FEC's
defense of multifactor tests.8 1 He also rejected reliance on "contex-
tual" factors in determining whether the ads were the equivalent
of express advocacy.8 2 The contextual factors that the Chief
Justice rejected were issues that had become factors in the
campaign, the timing of the ads close to the election and after the
Senate had adjourned," and cross-references in the text of the ad
to a web site.' Chief Justice Roberts concluded:
Given the standard we have adopted for determining whether
an ad is the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy,
contextual factors of the sort invoked by appellants should
seldom play a significant role in the inquiry. Courts need not
ignore basic background information that may be necessary to
put an ad in context ... but the need to consider such
background should not become an excuse for discovery or a
79. Id. at 469-470.
80. Id. at 470.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 472.
83. Id. (calling the timing of the advertisements "irrelevant").
84. Id. at 473 (concluding that "[alny express advocacy on the Web site, already one
step removed from the text of the ads themselves, certainly does not render an interpreta-
tion of the ads as genuine issue ads unreasonable").
562 [Vol. 43
2014] Citizens United and Social Welfare Organizations
broader inquiry of the sort we have just noted raises First
Amendment concerns.8
The Chief Justice provided a pointed summary of his opinion
in his rejection of the position taken by Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion
asserting that Chief Justice Roberts' test was "impermissibly
vague" and emphasizing the need for greater clarity to protect
political speech." Chief Justice Roberts responded:
As should be evident, we agree with Justice SCALIA on the
imperative for clarity in this area; that is why our test affords
protection unless an ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate. It is why we emphasize that (1) there can
be no free-ranging intent-and-effect test; (2) there generally
should be no discovery or inquiry into the sort of "contextual"
factors highlighted by the FEC and intervenors; (3) discussion
of issues cannot be banned merely because the issues might be
relevant to an election; and (4) in a debatable case, the tie is
resolved in favor of protecting speech.
Chief Justice Roberts' summary of his approach to characterizing
types of speech for purposes of determining whether each type is
properly subject to limitations or conditions imposed under fed-
eral campaign finance law could well serve as a summary of
the reasoning in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Citizens
United.
Justice Kennedy rejected more limited approaches to
resolving the claims by Citizens United and insisted that "the
Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without
chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning
and purpose of the First Amendment."8 Justice Kennedy had
85. Id. at 473-474. The Chief Justice offered as an example of a possibly relevant and
permissible contextual inquiry "whether an ad describes a legislative issue that is either
currently the subject of legislative scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in
the near future." Id. at 474 (internal quotations omitted).
86. Id. at 474 n. 7 (citing id. at 492-494 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329. Justice Kennedy continued this argument in the
following terms: "It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so
the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. Indeed, a court would be
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rejected certain of the more limited approaches suggested by
either Citizens United or by various of the amici on the grounds
that
[tihe First Amendment does not permit laws that force
speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct
demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings
before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.
Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws
chill speech: People "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at [the law's] meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." ... The Government may not render a ban on political
speech constitutional by carving out a limited exemption
through an amorphous regulatory interpretation.8 9
Fact-finding will be curtailed based on assertions that doing
so protects speech. Justice Kennedy found that regulation inevi-
tably meant restrictions on speech, stating that "[a]s additional
rules are created for regulating political speech, any speech
arguably within their reach is chilled."" Justice Kennedy
described FEC regulations as imposing "unique and complex
rules."9' He noted that, in response to WRTL II, which articulated
what Justice Kennedy described as an objective test for
determining what constitutes the functional equivalent of express
advocacy, "the FEC adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing test
to implement WRTL's ruling."" Justice Kennedy concluded that
the FEC's regulations
may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of
that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to
seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes
place.... As a practical matter, however, given the complexity
of the regulations and the deference courts show to adminis-
trative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats
of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against
FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior
permission to speak. . . . These onerous restrictions thus
remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the
necessity of making a broader ruling." Id.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id. at 334.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 334-335.
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function as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC
power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and
17th-century England, laws and governmental practices of the
sort that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit.9 3
Justice Kennedy concluded with an analysis of the balance of
powers and the role of the courts in protecting the First
Amendment right of political speech:
[T]he FEC has created a regime that allows it to select what
political speech is safe for public consumption by applying
ambiguous tests. If parties want to avoid litigation and the
possibility of civil and criminal penalties, they must either
refrain from speaking or ask the FEC to issue an advisory
opinion approving of the political speech in question. Gov-
ernment officials pore over each word of a text to see if,
in their judgment, it accords with the 11-factor test they
have promulgated. This is an unprecedented governmental
intervention into the realm of speech.94
The majority in Citizens United emphasized the shortcomings of
administrative agencies and suggested that questions relating to
political speech could not safely or responsibly be left to their
consideration and discretion.95 Justice Kennedy concluded:
Because the FEC's "business is to censor, there inheres the
danger that [it] may well be less responsive than a court-part
of an independent branch of government-to the constitu-
tionally protected interests in free expression.". . . When the
FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, "[m]any
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-
case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected
speech-harming not only themselves but society as a whole,
which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.".. .
Conse 9uently, "the censor's determination may in practice be
final."9
93. Id. at 335.
94. Id. at 336.
95. See id. at 335 (finding that the reliance on administrative agencies leads to
onerous restrictions on speech).
96. Id. at 335-336. This facile characterization of a duly established government
agency, acting pursuant to properly delegated authority to interpret and implement law,
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This analysis was based on the multifactor test used by the
FEC, but that does not mean that the reliance on similar facts
and circumstances determinations for tax law purposes would
differ in tone or substance. Whether the statute being interpreted
deals directly with political speech or indirectly with political
speech, the Court in Citizens United took the position that other
governmental actors, whether Congress or an administra-
tive agency, should not have discretion to burden the First
Amendment right of political speech.
V. THE IRS'RESPONSE TO CITIZENS UNITED
The interpretation and administration of tax law turns on
consideration of the facts and circumstances of particular cases in
light of the statutory requirements and the available guidance.
The IRS gave no indication of considering the implications of
Citizens United in order to reconcile the expanded scope for
political campaign activities with the requirement that § 501(c)(4)
organizations operate primarily to promote the social welfare of
the people of the community. The leadership of the exempt
organization function in place during the 2012 election cycle did
not simply fail to issue guidance. That leadership gave every
indication that it had made a decision to not issue guidance. That
decision seemed to control its actions even after it had come to
understand that its strategy for dealing with the impending
release of the Inspector General's report had not been well
received. Indeed, the IRS agreed to implement every recommen-
dation in the Inspector General's Report except the recommenda-
tion that the IRS issue guidance so that the public and the
regulated community could more readily comply and so that the
enforcement policies could be more readily understood." The IRS
offered to increase staff training instead." None of the people
responsible for this response remained employed at the IRS long
enough thereafter to explain their reasoning.
as a "censor" invites specific refutation, but that enterprise is beyond the scope of the
present Article.
97. See TIGTA Report, supra n. 5, at 16-17 (containing the IRS response to the
Inspector General's recommendations).
98. Id.
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The new leadership at the IRS immediately reversed course
and pledged to issue guidance." The task confronting the IRS
moving forward will be challenging, to say the least. The task is
not to issue guidance on a clear slate. The task is to issue guid-
ance on a very messy slate reflecting the compound failures of the
past and the resulting vested interests that have arisen in
response to these administrative failures and lapses. Whether an
administrative agency can do this successfully is an open ques-
tion. Whether the IRS can do this in the current situation is by no
means certain.
The Supreme Court's position on multifactor tests as a
burden on First Amendment rights is an important complexity
confronting the IRS. If consideration of multiple factors creates
uncertainty for the public and for the regulated community at the
same time that it is impermissibly expanding the scope of the
agency's discretion, what is the alternative? The alternative is not
simply an approach that will consider political speech. The regu-
latory task of the IRS is to preserve the integrity of tax exemption
while protecting political speech. These two considerations do not
necessarily point in the same direction. This is the constitutional
terrain that the IRS will have to navigate in light of Citizens
United. It will also have to navigate a terrain of vested interests
created by the IRS itself through its tactical use of § 501(c)(4) as a
"catchall" or a "dumping ground" for so many decades.
On November 29, 2013, the IRS and Department of the
Treasury issued proposed regulations dealing with election cam-
paign activity by § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations."'o The
proposed regulation amends Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a) by replacing the concept of "political campaign intervention"
with the concept of "candidate-related political activity."10 1 The
proposed regulations are intended to provide greater clarity and
certainty in distinguishing political activities from social welfare
activities by reducing dependence on fact-intensive determina-
tions. 10 2 The preamble to the proposed regulations states that
99. Daniel Werfel, Charting a Path Forward at the IRS: Initial Assessment and Plan of
Action 14 (IRS 2013) (available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment
%20and%20Plan%20ofio20Action.pdf).
100. 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (Nov. 29, 2013).
101. Id. at 71536.
102. Id.
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[t]he Treasury Department and the IRS recognize that more
definitive rules with respect to political activities related to
candidates-rather than the existing, fact-intensive analysis-
would be helpful in applying the rules regarding qualification
for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). Although more
definitive rules might fail to capture (or might sweep in)
activities that would (or would not) be captured under the IRS'
traditional facts and circumstances approach, adopting rules
with sharper distinctions in this area would provide greater
certainty and reduce the need for detailed factual analysis in
determining whether an organization is described in section
501(c)(4).103
The emphasis on replacing determinations based on facts and
circumstances of particular cases with distinctions that appear
clearer is consistent with the Court's insistence that complex
regulatory tests are constitutionally impermissible.' Questions
of the appropriate nature and degree of administrative discretion
are important issues that are not addressed explicitly in the regu-
lations, but it would be difficult to understand the proposed regu-
lations without considering this element of Citizens United and
WRTL II.
Given this context, there are reasons to welcome the new
regulations as an important step forward from the implosion of
the Exempt Organizations Division. These regulations indicate
that the new leadership of the IRS and Treasury Department
understand the importance of guidance in enabling compliance by
the regulated community and principled enforcement by the IRS.
Although disputes over guidance may be intense, they are unlikely
to produce the toxic atmosphere of accusations of mistreatment of
particular organizations that have characterized the 2013 dispute
over the IRS' treatment of particular organizations during the
2012 election cycle.
103. Id. at 71536-71537. The preamble to the proposed regulations also states:
The Treasury Department and the IRS acknowledge that the approach taken in
these proposed regulations, while clearer, may be both more restrictive and more
permissive than the current approach, but believe the proposed approach is justi-
fied by the need to provide greater certainty to section 501(c)(4) organizations
regarding their activities and reduce the need for fact-intensive determinations.
Id. at 71538.
104. See supra pt. IV (examining WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 469).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The IRS found itself in the eye of the wrong storm due to its
century-long failure to issue guidance that enabled compliance
and explained enforcement. Congress bears some substantial
responsibility for this state of affairs. Nothing would have
prevented Congress from amending § 501(c)(4) and from exer-
cising its broad oversight authority to address the issues arising
from the failure of guidance.
The more useful issue relates to how the IRS and the exempt
organization community go forward. The response to date sug-
gests that the IRS is being reconstituted, but that reform will be a
long, difficult process.'0o The unasked question is whether there is
support for reform within that larger community of exempt
entities or whether the redesign of § 501(c)(4) has been quietly
embraced by organizations that still have some social welfare
purpose apart from shaping election outcomes. Uncertainty over
the answer provides strong evidence of the importance of Citizens
United in redesigning social welfare organizations to minimize
the importance of the organizations' exempt activities and to
enable their use as campaign finance vehicles.
105. See Werfel, supra n. 99, at 5 (admitting in response to the questions raised about
IRS practices of regulating § 501(c)(4) organizations that "this Report does not purport to
provide a complete and final set of answers at this time").
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